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Secularist Drea s  a d Wo e ’s Rights : Notes o  a  A iguous Relatio ship * 
This article analyses the impact of the manipulation of the religious and the secular i  o e s 
rights discourses and practices. It problematizes the concept of secularization and 
desecularization in light of the recognition of the limits of modernity. It also addresses the 
possibility of a postcolonial and post-se ula ist dis ou se o  hu a  a d o e s ights, 
opening up the way for the recognition of the emancipatory potential of some forms of 
religiously inspired feminism. For this, it is necessary to consider the contribution made by 
various types of feminism to alternative understandings and practices from the point of view 
of an emancipatory and ecological interpretation of human rights.  
Keywords: human rights; feminisms; social movements; religion; secularization. 
 
 
We are in a historical moment in which feminism can be 
easily annexed to the project of empire. 
Sherene Razack (2007: 7) 
 
 
The issue of o e s ights see s to offe  a p i ileged positio  f o  hi h to o se e the 
potential, limitations and ambiguities of the discourse and practices of modernity, 
particularly as regards two of its fundamental principles: secularization (with its reduction of 
religion to the private sphere) and human rights. The debate about the human rights of 
women is often dominated by approaches that seem to place even more veils on women (as 
much in the West as in the East), and in some cases these approaches have been promoted 
by other women influenced by a single model of feminism. This issue, which according to 
some authors dates back to colonial times (Ahmed, 1992), has acquired a sharper focus since 
11 September 2001, particularly in Europe. It is especially visible in the interpretations and 
assessments made of the lifestyles of Islamic women, both inside and outside Europe, and 
consequently, of the whole Islamic population, whether migrants or residing in Muslim 
countries. According to these perspectives and opinions, Islamic women often constitute 
the othe  of the othe ,  that is, the ost adi all  diffe e t of the diffe e t, the eside t  
that is ost alie ,  to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak (2002: 47). It is worth analysing some of 
the posters that were used by right-wing parties in Switzerland during the referendum of 29 
November 2009 concerning the construction of mosques the fa ous i a et ase  in 
                                                 
* Article published in RCCS 90 (September 2010). I would like to thank Cláudia Ramos, Francisco Queiroga and 
Rui Estrada for kindly reading and commenting on this text. 
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order to understand how the issue of ultu al alienness  is also associated with a sense of 
threat, a d oth a e h pe -ritualized  i  the i ages that a e p odu ed of o e . For 
example, one of the posters depicted, in the foreground, a veiled woman with a threatening 
gaze.1  
But o  this stage  a othe  uestio  is also ei g pla ed out, that of the e-e e ge e  
o  pe a e e  of the public impact of religion, since the roles that the different religions 
attribute to women (and therefore the conception that each one has of the fundaments and 
expressions of the human rights of women and the ways in which this framework of values 
affects their lives) are also being used increasingly as a weapon in disputes between 
different worldviews. It has e o e o o pla e to att i ute to the eligio  of othe s  a 
failure to respect the rights of women, which thereby serves as a scale for measuring the 
degree of perfection of a particular culture, society and lifestyle.2 Thus, o ie talist  “aid, 
 i o atio s of dis espe t fo  the ights of o e  a e f e ue tl  used i  the West as 
a sig  of the so io-political and cultural backwardness  of other societies, becoming one 
more pretext for interference that is not always grounded in human rights. For example, in a 
radio message broadcast on 17 November 2002, Laura Bush, addressing the American 
atio , stated: Ci ilized people th oughout the o ld a e speaki g out i  ho o  – not only 
because of our heartbreak for the women and children of Afghanistan, but also because in 
Afghanistan, we see the world the terrorists would like to i pose o  the est of us  apud 
Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002: 341).  
O  the othe  ha d, Isla s eje tio  of the West ofte  i ludes a epudiatio  of the 
supposedl  pe issi e  eha iou  of its o e ,  o side ed o e o e sig  of o al 
decadence,  frequently perceived as the result of secularization. On this subject, it is worth 
reading the comments of Akbar S. Ahmed (1992: 178) on the Western media, which he holds 
responsible for the dissemination and reinforcement of the o o  ste eot pe of Weste  
                                                 
1




decryptees_1274290_3214.html. This topic requires much further research. 
2
 On this subject, we may recall the words of the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon, D. José da Cruz Policarpo, who in 
January 2009, in the Auditorium of the Figueira da Foz Casino, in a talk with journalist Fátima Campos Ferreira, 
claimed, on the subject of Portuguese o e  i ol ed i  elatio ships ith Musli s: Be a eful a out ho 
you love. Think twice about marrying a Muslim, think very seriously about it, because you might be letting 
yourself in for a great deal of trouble. Not even Allah knows where that might e d  
(http://ultimahora.publico.clix.pt/noticia.aspx?id=1356031). 
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women as promiscuous,  o fi ed, i  his pe spe ti e,  the epo ts of o te po a  
Weste  o e  isito s to Musli  ou t ies.  That stereotype offers a view of Western 
women ith thei  legs ide ope , aiti g fo  se  o  a  o ets.  According to Ahmed, 
this is the so t of i age hi h would agitate the mind of any Muslim father,  a d 
constitutes a  i sult ot o l  to Weste  ut to all o e  (Ahmed, 1992: 178).  
But religion is also often invoked by women in both West and East as an inspiration for 
the defence of their rights. Does religion therefore hold some emancipatory potential for 
them? Might it be possible to use it as a tool of liberation and reconcile it with an 
emancipatory interpretation of human rights? And would these be, per se, rights of/for 
women?  
This article analyses the impact of the manipulation of the religious and the secular upon 
the dis ou ses a d p a ti es of o e s ights, egi i g  p o le atizi g the o epts of 
secularization and desecularization in light of the recognition of the limits of modernity, as 
ell as the a s i  hi h the  a e used to pla e those o side ed alie  to Eu o e t i  
dis ou se o  the othe  side of the li e  “a tos, . It also addresses the possibility of a 
postcolonial and post-secularist dis ou se o  hu a  a d o e s rights that could 
ultimately lead to the recognition of the emancipatory potential of some forms of 
religiously-inspired feminism.  
 
1. Secularization, dese ularizatio  a d the other side of the li e  
Western societies seem to ha e a oke  f o  thei  se ula ist d ea .  Habermas spoke of a 
post-se ula  so iet   a d Be ge   of the desecularization of the world.  For 
some authors, secularization was itself an illusory or unfinished project, while for others it is 
now threatened by a revival of religious expressions that they consider to be alien to the 
dominant worldview in their geographic and cultural space.  
These uestio s a d ealities halle ge the Weste  o ld s pe eptio  of itself, as ell 
as the paradigm of modernity as a project of emancipation, secularization and, more 
recently, multiculturalism. In fact, underlying all these references for European and 
Eurocentric identity is that which some authors, such as Kaufmann (1989: 34), consider to be 
in need of de thologizatio  – that is to say, the deconstruction of the project of 
modernity itself. This would suggest that this demythologization involves the deconstruction 
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of modernity as a general theory and the recognition of the existence of different 
interpretations of secularization.  
 
1.1. The deconstruction of modernity as a general theory and the various interpretations of 
secularization 
Modernity emerged and imposed itself not only as a new phase of Western history, but 
above all as a global project fo  the pe fe t so iet ,  based on the principles of a universal 
enlightened rationality as epitomised in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, which constituted the inspiration for a radically new social order. Thanks to the 
social movements that sprang up in reaction to the industrial revolution and early capitalism, 
to liberal currents that affirmed the rights of citizenship in opposition to absolute forms of 
o al po e , a d to the lood, s eat a d tea s  o  hi h the fi st half of the 20th century 
was built, that new order ultimately led to the Declaration of Human Rights.  
Modernity was also shaped by the legitimate desire for independence from religion and 
from Western European Christianity, structured upon a dual classification system that was 
itself dualist. O  the o e ha d, the e as the dualis  et ee  this o ld  a d the e t,  
a d o  the othe , a othe  dualis  i  this o ld  et ee  the eligious  a d the se ula  
spheres, in which the Church in fact brandished two swords – po e  o e  the He eafte  
and religious power in this world. In modernity, therefore, the religious realm ceased to be 
an all-encompassing reality. The secular realm took over that role and religion had to find its 
place within it. Thus, the project for a universal rationality led to the separation of Church 
and State, which meant that the Catholic Church had to come to terms with the fact that its 
dream of Christendom would never return and that it was impossible to reconcile these two 
projects of universality: the project of modern rationality, which generated the notion of 
itize ship by right,  and that of the Church wielding an authority urbi et orbe over the 
secular world.  
Secularized society generated unease in religious institutions, particularly as regards its 
project to relegate religion to the private domain. This unease is not exclusive to Christianity; 
indeed, it can be found in an even more pronounced form in Islam, particularly in sectors 
that view secularism as the product of modernity and, therefore, of the West. It obviously 
takes on more aggressive and radical contours in the various forms of fundamentalism – 
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whether Islamic or Evangelical3 – which view secularism as their main enemy, due to its 
a th opo e t i  worldview which places man and his unaided reason at the centre of the 
u i e se  )eida , 2002: 207). However, there are also dimensions of secularization and 
ways of understanding and expressing it that deserve closer examination.  
The concept of secularization is a controversial one that has been much debated. It 
initially referred to the separation of Church and State, and to the appropriation of 
ecclesiastical property by the civil authorities; however, it was later extended to culture, 
coming to signify its autonomy in relation to religious symbols (Berger, 1969). Wilson (1966: 
 defi es it as the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose their 
social significance.  Luckmann, in his work The Invisible Religion (1967), radicalizes this 
understanding of the secularization process, conside i g that it o sists of a loss of public 
relevance of religion.  For him, self-expression and self-realization have become the 
i isi le eligio  of ode it , as t aditio al eligious i stitutio s e a e i easingly 
irrelevant and marginal for the functioning of the modern world, with modern religion no 
longer inhabiting the temples. This insight was followed up by Niklas Luhmann (1977), who 
considers secularization to be a consequence of the reduction of religion to a voluntary 
element within the social system, which has itself ceased to be determined by religion or its 
substitutes.4  
Taylor (2007), for his part, adds a third feature to the definition of secularization as the 
separation of religious and state institutions and as a distancing from religious practice. 
According to his perspective, the core of the secularization process, which leads him to 
speak of the p ese t e a as ei g se ula ,  lies in a  exclusive humanism  ibid.: 19), which 
consists of a move from a society in which belief in God is practically unchallenged and, 
i deed, u p o le ati , to o e i  hi h it is u de stood to e o e optio  a o g othe s  
(ibid.: 3).  
Casanova (1994), on the other hand, points out that, in the 1980s, religion entered the 
public sphere, abandoning the place that had been attributed to it in the private sphere. He 
holds that, in this phase, there were few conflicts that were unrelated to religion, which 
                                                 
3
 For an in-depth analysis of the various trends within political theology (pluralistic and revelationist, 
particularly in Christianity and Islam), see the important text by Santos (2009). 
4
 He is referring to Du khei s o i tio  that eligio , though a ed f o  the ode  o ld, ould e 
epla ed  a ki d of i il eligio ,  as the whole of society would require rituals for the reinforcement of its 
values.  
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appeared in the form of social protests, struggles for justice and theories of the 
revolutionary role of religion (the various forms of liberation theology offer an example of 
this).5 
This author, whose work Public Religions in the Modern World (1994) is essential for the 
debate on secularization, believes that, to understand the nuances of this multifaceted 
phenomenon, it is necessary to separate the ideological critique of religion, which he 
considers typical of the Enlightenment, from the theory of secularization, and distinguish 
between the loss of functions traditionally assumed by religion in public life and its pure and 
simple privatization or marginalization. In his opinion, the differentiation and loss of the 
social functions of religion do not necessarily entail its privatization. Thus, according to 
Casanova, there are three different facets of secularization:  
a) Secularization as differentiation: the recognition that the fusion of religious and 
political community is incompatible with the modern principle of citizenship; the loss of 
eligio s o pulso  ha acter has led religious freedom to transform all religions into 
denominations, leaving aside functions that are not religious;  
b) Secularization as religious decline: this thesis originated in the Enlightenment critique 
of religion, which envisaged the end of religion through loss of relevance; this, i  Casa o a s 
view, led some political movements and governments to impose secularization through 
State policy;6  
c) Secularization as the confinement of religion to the private sphere: the specialization 
that resulted from modernity (i.e. the plurality of knowledges and consequent institutional 
seg e tatio  edu ed eligio  to a se to ial optio , hi h depe ds upo  the i di idual s 
private conscience and choice.  
However, according to Casanova (one of the first authors to make this claim), we are at 
present witnessing a dep i atizatio  of eligio  i  the ode  o ld  : 5). That is to 
say, religion no longer accepts (if in fact it ever did) the marginal and privatized role  
assigned to it by theories of modernity and secularization. Indeed, religion has recovered its 
political role and its desire to influence social and public life. This challenges the 
                                                 
5
 For an overview of the various political and liberation theologies, see Santos (2009). 
6
 In fact, this seems to have occurred in some African and Arab countries, where governments emerging from 
emancipation struggles and movements (mostly Marxist-inspired) tried to eradicate religion, on the basis of the 
self-fulfilled p ophe  of the disappea a e of eligio  due to its la k of ele a e to a pe fe t so ialist 
society.  
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Enlightenment view of religion as something from the private domain, destined to 
disappear.  
Casa o a s central thesis is problematic for some authors, such as Pollack (2003), who 
considers that it does not allow the relation and compatibility between individual and social 
responsibilities to be understood and regulated in such a way as to guarantee that freedom 
of religious expression does not undermine the secular structure and logic of the State. 
Moreover, the public or private role attributed to religion also depends upon the role that is 
(or is not) recognised for religion in general. For the Western world, the question appears to 
reside in the limits of secularization and of globalized modern society itself, in which, in the 
words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2009: 14), the reduction of the public space (i.e. the 
depoliti izatio  of olle ti e life  is accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the 
space occupied by religion. We may ask, therefore, how the re-emergence of the religious 
dese ula izatio  a  e a ti ulated ith the pa adig atic reference to human rights 
( oth e a ipated hild e  of that same social order) if we take into account the fact that 
secularized societies with elements of desecularization increasingly invoke their religious 
roots to draw the li e that sepa ates the  f o  othe s  that ha e different religious 
traditions.  
 
1.2. Dese ularizatio  a d the other side of the li e  
The expansion of the space of religion, and also of a Eurocentric argument based on religion, 
is manifested in the perplexity7 often shown in the aftermath of violent events and breaches 
of human rights (such as terrorist attacks and murders, including the so- alled ho ou  
crimes  pe pet ated agai st o e . To so e e te t, e see  to e u a le to see the 
wood for the trees,  fo  fo usi g upo  su h i o it  phe o e a o eals the o alit  
of daily life for most Muslims, particularly in Europe. These events also serve to justify 
reactions of estrangement and rejection of anyone that is perceived to e diffe e t f o  
us.  According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 3), this distinction between us  a d 
the othe s  has its oots i  a fo  of a ssal thi ki g,  typical of modernity, which creates 
the illusio  of the i possi ilit  of the o-presence of two sides of the line.   
                                                 
7
 Reactions of perplexity may range from the simple effort to understand what is happening to full-fledged 
xenophobia, particularly directed against Islam. See, for example, the statements made by Umberto Bossi, of 
the Northern League in Italy, who proclaimed, Eu ope is a d ust e ai  Ch istia .  For this and more 
documented examples, see Skenderovic (2006). 
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For A a t a “e   this p o ess of lassifi atio  alo g i ilizatio al li es  i ol i g 
antagonistic identities) is a fo  of o fi e e t,  as it encloses people within one group, 
restricting them to a single identity, while simultaneously assuming that all human relations 
may be analysed from the perspective of relations between different civilizations. The 
categorization also stereotypes the other as someone that has to fit the representation that 
we make of him/her, including on the religious level.  
The othe  side of the sto ,  the side of the Muslims in Europe, is thus largely unknown, 
o  is su je ted to a he e euti s of suspi io  that atte pts to de o st u t hat is 
considered to be an inherent aggressive tendency in the Islamic religion. This perspective 
grants no legitimacy to critiques of Western i.e. odern and se ula ized  lifest les by 
Musli  i telle tuals, he  i  fa t the Musli  uestio  i  Weste  so ieties aises the 
p o le  of the li its of ode it , oth as a ultu al o de  as ell as its ul-de-sacs.  
Perhaps this is another reason for the defensive reactions that are often displayed against 
a ifestatio s of othe  oi es,  o  oi es of othe s,  a d of othe  eligio s  i side 
Europe.8 This tendency reveals, among other things, the fear of the return of public 
expressions of religion, in general mixed with a conscious or unconscious vestige of a 
Christian understanding of the European identity. This, then, would seem to confirm 
Hervieu-L ge s thesis, a o di g to hi h the t pi al Eu opea  attitude to eligio  o sists 
i  elo gi g ithout believing.  
This attitude entails a distant shared memory, which does not necessitate shared belief, but 
hi h − e e  f o  a dista e – still governs collective reflexes in terms of identity. The Danish 
citizens who do not believe in God and never attend church, but who faithfully continue to pay 
the tax that goes to the Lutheran Church because they like to see religious buildings properly 
maintained, and the French citizens who are nostalgic for the beautiful church services of their 
childhood and complain about mosques being built in France while never setting foot in church 
u til the ell tolls  for them, illust ate ho  o e a  elo g ithout elie i g,  the European 
counterpart to the expansion of beliefs without belonging. (2006: 3) 
This elo gi g ithout elie i g  seems to be perfectly compatible with secularization 
and is sometimes used as a pretext for the suppression and silencing of cultural differences 
i  Eu ope. This ight lead us to o de  hethe  se ula izatio  is ot itself a t pe of 
                                                 
8
 Cf. the debate on the building of mosques in European capitals, mentioned above, which constitutes a good 
example of this fea  of o -Eu opea  eligio s (Der Spiegel Spezial, 2008). See also a televised debate, 
available online, between Tariq Ramadan and Yvan Perrin of the U.D.C., the party that received the most votes 
in the Swiss elections of 2006: http://sport-trops.com/marocfoot/2008/05/26/debat-tariq-ramadan-vs-yvan-
perrin-emission-infrarouge/ (accessed 20 October 2009). On the dimension of the question in Europe, see 
Evans (2009). 
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eligio  fo  so e states, hethe  it has ot e o e a  e use to ei fo e othe  fo s of 
Eurocentricity with ega d to peoples o side ed to e o  the othe  side of the line,  a d 
whethe  the e ight ot e ist a  O ie talizatio  of the eligio  of othe s. In fact, we might 
ask if the post-Ch istia  se ula ist hege o  has ot ge e ated a e  a  of thi king and 
a discourse that justifies Eurocentric superiority by the fact that the European lifestyle is 
secularized, but which nevertheless results from the secularization of Christian societies. 
That is to say, might the distinction between public and private typical of Western modernity 
ulti atel  e a lo al solutio ? For Boaventura de Sousa Santos, se ula is  hi h should 
be distinguished f o  se ula it  is as u h a pa t of Ch istia it  as the Ch istia  eligio . 
Secularism and the Christian religio  e e pa t of the sa e olo ial pa kage  “a tos, 
2009: 15).  
Tariq Ramadan has pointed to the quasi-aporia generated by the (sometimes 
posthumous) identification of Europe with Christianity and/or post-Christianity. He insists 
that it is possible to be a Eu opea  Musli  a d st esses the eed to shape an Islamic-
European identity out of the isis  (1999: 101) – that is to say, to develop an identity that is 
capable of transcending the sense of exclusion that causes reactive attitudes. If that is 
impossible, and Islam is alien to Europe, then it is impossible to be Muslim and European at 
the same time. If this claim is based on an allegedly European religious identity (that is 
specifically Christian or post-Christian), then the success of the whole modern secularization 
project is at risk (since the references for the construction of identity continue to be 
religious).  
This is, then, a complex game in which the argument of secularism is used to exclude or 
make invisible those that (often allegedly)9 have a non-Christian religious identity. This 
generates a paradox. For while secularism is sometimes used in opposition to religion in 
ge e al, hi h is o side ed to e a disti ti e featu e of ultu al a k a d ess  that is 
damaging to certain groups, at other times it is used to reinforce a (secularized  ultu al 
ide tit  hi h is, ulti atel , o side ed to fo  pa t of a pa ti ula  eligio , hi h, fo  its 
part, having been relegated to the private sphere, is now invoked in the public sphere (often 
                                                 
9
 I remember hearing Abdourahman Waberi, an African writer born in Djibouti, say, ironically, that he had 
discovered his Islamic identity when he arrived in Europe and was told that he was Muslim. Waberi said this at 
the Net o ki g Eu opea  Citize ship Edu atio  NECE  o fe e e o  ‘ethi ki g Citize ship Edu atio  i  
European Migration Societies: Political Strategies – Social Changes – Edu atio al Co epts  Lis o , 26-28 April 
2007). To access his personal page: http://waberi.free.fr/index00.html. 
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by secular authorities) to reduce some people (particularly women) once more to the 
private.  
 
2. The pretext of wo e ’s rights 
These questions are reproduced in discourses about the rights of women, assuming specific 
contours and generating what Razack (2004 a d :  des i es as the ete al t ia gle 
of the imperilled Muslim woman, the dangerous Muslim man and the civilized European.  
This triangle may be present both in state discourses designed to reject external signs and 
ultu al t a es of the alie ,  and in acritical campaigns by feminist groups against human 
rights abuses. In both cases, although in different ways, the result may be the reproduction 
of the stereotype that attributes the private domain to women. A d, as e e see , the 
relegation of religion to the private sphere was the desired aim of the secularization process. 
In the era of post-se ula izatio , the eligio  of othe s  is assigned to the private sphere 
also through the relegation of women, once more, to that sphere. And consciously or 
unconsciously, that strategy is often justified by the supposed desire to defend their rights in 
the public sphere. Let us analyse some examples of this strategy, in particular the arguments 
used by President Sarkozy against the use of the burka in France, and those presented by 
Norwegian feminist movements against forced marriages, analysed by Razack (2004).  
In 2009, on a visit to Drôme, more specifically to the Chapel of Vercors (symbolic site of 
the French resistance during World War II), Sarkozy made a speech in which he praised the 
love of the fatherland and French values. The speech included a passage in which he 
referred to the incompatibility of the burka with France. After describing France as a pluralist 
country, where diversity reigns, Sarkozy invoked what he believed to be common to all 
French people: the p ofou d u it  of ou  ultu e, a d, da e I sa  it, of ou  i ilizatio  ibid.: 
3). For him, the French view Ch istia it  a d the E lighte e t as t o sides of the sa e 
civilization of which they are the heirs  : .  
Despite addi g that to e F e h is ot to let o eself get e losed i  a eligio  : 
4), he did not refer to religious pluralism, which permits the coexistence of different 
religions, but rather to a pluralism of ideas that include atheism, Christianity and secularism, 
hi h he defi es as the espe t fo  all faiths a d the eut alit  of the “tate,  at the sa e 
ti e as he otes the espe ta ilit  of all eligious se ti e ts that o e f o  the depths of 
ti e  ibid.: 7). What Sarkozy identifies as tolerance, proper to the French nation, leads him 
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to say, the efo e, dea  o pat iots, a o e that o es to F a e ith the i te tio  of 
p o oki g iole e a d hat ed agai st othe s shall e e pelled  ibid.: 7).  
It is in this o te t, i  hi h he des i es ei g F e h as adhe i g to a fo  of 
civilization, to its alues a d usto s  ibid.: 5), that Sarkozy makes his declaration 
concerning the use of the burka and its incompatibility with France:  
France is a land of liberty and equality. France is a country of emancipation where each can 
aspire to better himself in accordance with his talents, merits and hard work. France is a 
country where woman is free. France is a country where the Church is separate from the State, 
where the beliefs of each one are respected. But France is a country where there is no place 
for the burka, where there is no place for the subjection of women, for whatever reason, or 
under whatever condition or circumstance. (ibid.: 5)  
The analysis of Sa koz s spee h suggests that the uestio  of o e s ights has ee  
appropriated to support a way of thinking that might be des i ed as eo olo ial  o  – to 
use the terminology of Aníbal Quijano – under the cover of an epistemology marked by 
olo ialit ,  i.e.  the i positio  of a a ial/eth i  lassifi atio  of the o ld s populatio  
as the cornerstone of this pattern of power,  hi h ope ates o  all ate ial a d su je ti e 
le els a d di e sio s of dail  so ial e iste e a d o  the so ietal s ale  (2000: 342). The 
subject of women's rights, here a pretext to prohibit the use of the burka, is used as a 
weapon of cultural attack, whose objective seems to be to affirm the supposed civilizational 
superiority of the West (in this case, more specifically, France). We should note that the 
question of religion is also used as a ite io  fo  disti guishi g et ee  those that a e 
i side  a d those that a e from outside ; the e is o efe e e to a eligious plu alis  that 
includes Islam, but rather to a pluralist secularism that has to respect the religious values of 
Ch istia it  those that ha e o e f o  the depths of ti e . He e, se ula is  a d 
Christianity, two sides of the same coin with regard to French identity, are invoked in order 
to render the women that use the burka invisible, in other words, to assert that there is no 
(public, visible) place for them in France.  
Let us move on to the second example, invoked by Razack (2004) in her analysis of how 
some Western feminist movements and personalities ha e pe ei ed the situatio  of 
Islamic women,  revealing, as we have seen, the existence of a triangle that perpetuates the 
idea of the Islamic woman in peril at the hands of dangerous Islamic men and the solidarity 
of i ilized  Eu ope. A o di g to Razack, this is the assumption that underlies the debate 
between feminist groups and currents, particularly in Norwegian legislation concerning 
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forced marriages.10 I shall ot li ge  o  that legislatio  a  fu the  tha  to e a i e ‘aza k s 
critique of Western feminists, whom she considers to ha e egu  to sha e conceptual and 
politi al te ai  ith the fa  ight  ibid.: 130). From her point of view, on the one hand they 
have allowed the sel es to e eguiled  the culturalist  discourse concerning violence 
against Islamic women, as if this were something particular to a given culture; and on the 
other hand, they support stricter immigration controls as a way of supposedly protecting 
Muslim women and girls from forced marriages, since, in accordance with the interpretation 
given by reports carried out in Norway, quoted by the author, these occur as a consequence 
of the fact that immigrants marry within their own cultures  (ibid.: 135). Razack considers 
this t pe of app oa h to e a ist as it is simply assumed that marriages contracted with 
partners of the same ethnic background who live outside Norway necessarily involve 
oe io  ibid.: 136), and no attention is given, for example, to the percentage of native 
Norwegians that also marry amongst themselves, both inside and outside the country.  
The question raised by Razack (who is herself of Muslim origin, and a feminist) is whether 
it is possi le to e o ile the st uggle fo  o e s ights ith a ie  that does ot fall i to 
what feminist and postcolo ial studies all the olo ial u i e salis  of Weste  atio alit ,  
as if there was a single model of human development and progress, also from the point of 
ie  of hu a  ights, a d, o e o etel , o e s ights.  
This involves, once more, the whole de ate o e i g the Weste ization  o  
othe ise  of the dis ou se a d p a ti es  of hu a  ights a d o e s ights, a d that 
which some authors have desig ated as the i pe ial  nature of some forms of feminism 
that conceive the Western model as the only possible reference for the emancipation of 
o e , the e  ghettoizi g  feminists of the Third World (Mohanty, 1991; Spivak, 1994).  
But also inscribed in this, though perhaps in a more subtle way, is the reference to 
religion as a mechanism for reinforcing the culturalist interpretation. Thus, according to 
Hege Storhaug, in his book Hu a  Visas: A Report fro  the Fro t Li es of Europe’s 
Integration Crisis, based on a report submitted by the Human Rights Department of the 
Norwegian Parliament and cited by Razack, the problem of forced marriages lies in the 
persistence in non-Weste  so ieties of the idea that the i di idual s o th is entirely 
dependent on religion, clan, caste, a d lass  apud Razack, 2004: 135). The culturalist 
                                                 
10
 ‘aza k  also a al ses the e iste e of this t ia gle  i  the de ate that o u ed i  O ta io, Ca ada, 
k o  as the “ha ia la  de ate.   
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                                                                 Secularist Drea s a d Wo e ’s Rights 
112 
interpretation, in which religion constitutes an important part, ignores women in their 
concreteness – for one, because it refers to a stereotype, which does recognise each 
o ete ase as u i ue; a d se o dl , e ause the ultu al atta k o  a o u it  al ead  
fearing for its ultu al su i al , i  the o ds of A -Na'im (2000: 2), concerning the analysis 
of this situatio  i  G eat B itai , leads to the te de  to reinforce the very practices that 
those on the outside are seeking to change.  This reinforcement is, once more, ad e s  
for women.  
Therefore, this raises the fundamental question of knowing whether a simultaneously 
postcolonial and post-secularist feminist discourse is possible – that is, one that defends the 
rights of women without falling into forms of racist feminism. What, then, would be the 
place of religion in such discourse?  
 
3. Religion and women: public space and private space 
Co side atio s of o e s hu a  ights i  the o te t of eligio  a d se ula izatio  a ot 
afford to underestimate the complexity of the subject, for religion plays a diversity of roles in 
different societies, and indeed, has played different roles within the same society at 
different times. Such a consideration also involves trying to get beyond the colonial 
discourse on religion and secularization, as well as attempting to articulate both with the 
rights of women, particularly those f o  the othe  side of the li e.  However, whether this 
line be geostrategic or mental, from this perspective, religion may also perform a number of 
different functions, and questions concerning secularization tend to be raised in ways that 
challenge Eurocentric mental schemata. In fact, as was said at the beginning, the question of 
the rights of women offers a privileged vantage point for studying the limits and potential of 
dis ou ses a out se ula izatio  a d hu a  ights. Fe i ist p o ou e e ts a out o e s 
ights f o  the othe  side of the li e  i  hi h o e  a e the p otago ists athe  tha  the 
object(s) of the discourse) may offer a privileged site for examining one of the foundation 
stones of the real and/or imaginary construct that is Western secularism: the dichotomy 
between the public and private, particularly as regards the relegation of religion and its 
impacts to the private sphere (i.e. its depoliticization).  
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Both secular feminists in Islamic countries and Islamic feminists11 recognise that religion 
may be used to legitimise the subjection of women. As an example of the former, we might 
recall, for example, the work of Mernissi (1987, 2001), one of the pioneers in the analysis of 
the bias in the interpretation of the Koran, who denounced the political use of the sacred 
texts and of the Hadit for the purpose of female subjection. The latter may be illustrated 
with the work of Barlas, ho holds that the Ko a  is ot a pat ia hal te t  a d that it 
ope s up the spa e fo  Musli s to de elop a theo  a d p a ti e of se ual e ualit  Ba las, 
2006: 2).  
However, secularist forms of feminism in Islamic countries have been criticised from two 
very different directions: nationalists and Islamic feminists. In different ways, both of these 
consider that secularist feminisms represent a concession to the West (see, for example, 
Razack, 2007 and Asad, 2003). Squeezed between the nationalist aspirations for liberation 
from colonial empires, which they shared and embraced, a d the a usatio  of i po ti g  
Western concepts, secularist feminists in countries such as Egypt won a place for women in 
the public worlds of work, education and politics (mostly as voters); however, they seem to 
have been unable to persuade governments (even those governments that have emerged 
out of independence movements and are socialist in orientation) to acknowledge equal 
rights for men and women in the domain of family law. It appears that the private rights of 
women have been the price to pay for social peace with more conservative sectors, for 
whom change in this area is so ethi g unnatural  Bad a , : .  
On the other hand, secularist feminists are also accused of complicity with orientalist 
representations (Barlas, 2006), both for confirming stereotypes that dichotomize Islam and 
fe i is , a d fo  so eti es falli g i to the sa e ge e alizatio s that esult f o  a glo al 
feminism.  For example, the use of the exp essio  the status of women in Islam  has been 
criticised, given the immense diversity within Islamic countries (Chowdhury, Farsakh and 
Srikanth, 2008: 446).  
The emergence of Islamic female emancipation movements in the 1990s seems, then, to 
constitute largely a reaction to the incapacity shown by secularist Islamic movements in 
resolving what appears to be the fundamental problem for women: family law. Islamic 
feminism challenges the dichotomy between the public and private and the effectiveness of 
                                                 
11
 “e ula  fe i is  refers to a secular social movement, and Isla i  fe i is  to a movement of religious 
inspiration (Badran, 2009). 
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the st uggle fo  o e s ights a d/o  state poli ies of regulation of those rights for their 
actual e a ipatio . The efo e, it is i  p i ate life that the politi al desti  of o e s 
rights is played out on a daily basis. Badran (2009) considers it impossible to alter this state 
of affairs without returning to an emancipatory interpretation of the texts of the Koran, in 
which patriarchal discourse and law are allegedly based. From her point of view, this means 
that the kind of feminism that is effective for Islamic women is, increasingly, Islamic 
feminism, i.e. that which seeks in the Koran a lever for the liberation of women, as it is the 
Koran that is invoked to justify their subjection. In this process, the dichotomy between 
public and private is once more questioned, as it also was in Western feminist movements. 
Religion is a tool of patriarchal politics which oppresses women in the private space. But it is 
in that private space that an emancipatory interpretation of religion may undermine the 
public-patriarchal political order. Wo e s p i ate oles, pa ti ula l  as edu ato s of thei  
children, have a public impact; and while they may of course reproduce a prescriptive social 
o de , the  a  also st et h the li its , to use the words of Mir-Hosseini (1996), becoming 
sites of an appeal to gender justice. It is on this side that many Islamic feminists have 
invested, fo  it is the last edou t  of their subjection. A revolution on the private side will 
have public impact, and therefore its appeal is political.  
 
4. Open issues 
As we have seen, the intention to protect the rights of women by manipulating the question 
of the eil  o  u ka  i  the Weste  o ld a  effe ti el  ei fo e o e s 
confinement to the private space, with the corollary that it also renders their religion 
invisible. We have also seen how this may be one of the collateral and contradictory effects 
of a Western feminism with universalist pretensions, which made the struggle against 
o e s o fi e e t to the p i ate sphe e o e of its main causes (in its second wave), and 
discovered its political import in the process. The ongoing debate seems to indicate that we 
are on dodgy terrain, with arguments that are often contradictory or dogmatic. Thus, there 
is a need for a more complex dialectical thought process in order to avoid falling into new 
reductionisms with destructive consequences, above all for women. This means that new 
questions need to be raised and some assumptions need to be questioned.  
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If the presumption of the universal and abstract nature of human rights, even for women, 
is unaccompanied by a complex political framework, it may run the risk of ahistoricism, 
resulting from an abstract universalism that is blind to the historical circumstances that 
influence the way in which these rights are applied differently in different times and places – 
or indeed at the same time. The first question that we might raise is whether the 
u i e salit  of hu a  ights  of o e  ight ot o stitute a false u i e salit ; in other 
words, if the e  postulatio  of the u i e sal  a  ot o stitute a  ope atio  of 
e so ship  hi h, in enunciating itself as such, codifies the exclusions through which it is 
produced, as Judith Butler has suggested (2002: 48-49).  
However, the postmodern and postcolonial problematization of the universal character of 
human rights in the name of respect for cultural and religious diversity and the need to avoid 
false generalizations may run the risk of obtaining the opposite of what is desired; according 
to Moller Okin (1997), it may slide towards a toxic multiculturalism that harms,  because it 
is based on the assumption (although not explicit) that cultural traditions are static and self-
legiti isi g, e e  at the ost of o e s ights.  
It might be useful to seek a a o  a  to a discourse on the human rights of women 
that neither eliminates those rights in the name of an acritical multiculturalism, nor erases 
o e s ealit  a d the violations of their rights in the name of an abstract notion of 
human being.  For this, it may be necessary to respond to the greater challenge of 
defending a postmodern approach that criticises both Western universal rationality and 
relativism – which threatens human rights, and here, concretely, the human rights of 
women.  
It is obvious that the reference to the secular or the religious does not, by itself, indicate 
whether the social and intellectual movements for o e s ights a e t ul  e a ipato ; 
all depends on their consequences for everyone involved. Moreover, it is difficult to address 
the place of secular or religious feminisms in the struggle for o e s ights ithout 
considering another issue, namely the relevance of a public space of debate. We might ask if 
this might not be a space he e h idizatio  a d contamination  Appiah,  a e 
possible, given the unrealistic nature of the discourse of the immutability and 
impermeability of cultures. We li e i  border zo es  (Santos, 2007) in hi h a  e olog  of 
emancipatory experiences, both secular and religious, might be produced (Santos, 2006). For 
this to happen, we must accept that the public space is not a pre-established, immutable 
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arena,  and face the need to redefine its frontiers, and its o ati e alues  (Göle, 2007: 
5). Might there be a future for the proposal put forward by this Turkish author, resident in 
F a e, a o di g to hi h pu li  spa e, pa ti ula l  the Eu opea , a  e i agi ed as as 
an ethical and physical frame that enables us to develop a common civility drawn from 
liberal pluralism as well as a plurality of religious experiences  ibid.)? Only the (near) future 
will tell.  
Translated by Karen Bennett 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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